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It conveys an impression of gravity and dignity, and at the same time of grace and 
attractiveness. The first in its dark deep state, the latter in its light attenuated tint; and thus 
the dignity of the age and the amiableness of youth may adorn itself with degrees of the 
same hue.
 Wolfgang von Goethe, on red, in Theory of Colours, trans. Charles Lock Eastlake 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970)
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Daniel Telech
Introduction
The Oresteia ends joyfully:  Orestes is acquitted of the crime of matricide; the 
Furies become honorable; and both of these because Athens initiates the rule of 
law. According to an intuitively plausible interpretation of the Aeschylean trilogy, 
this joyful resolution is the result of a coolly rational transition from a primi-
tive cycle of vengeance to a court- centric response to crime.1 While the House of 
Atreus was trapped in a net of self- perpetuating vengeance— “the stuff of passion 
and partiality”— the establishment of the court in the Eumenides proceeds via an 
enlightened grasp of the institutions of punishment, which is subject to robust 
standards of rationality and impartiality. The prima facie plausibility of this 
“rationalistic” reading— where “rational” processes are construed as excluding 
and opposed to the affective— poses a challenge for Nietzschean readings of the 
Eumenides. This is true for two reasons. First, it is incompatible with Nietzsche’s 
view of the value of tragedy, according to which tragic theater psychologically 
invigorates the audience member by presenting her with a beautiful transfigu-
ration of the agonizing aspects of life. Second, if the rationalistic interpretation 
of the Eumenides were true, this would entail that Nietzsche reveres Aeschylus 
partly for the same reasons he disdains “Socratic optimism,” which he takes to 
mark the death of tragedy.2
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Fortunately the rationalistic interpretation is largely misguided. This is not to say 
that the establishment of legal intuitions in the Eumenides is the result of irrational 
attitudes; my claim is rather that it involves a joint effort of reason giving, persua-
sion, and beautiful illusion. Its agents do display responsiveness to reasons, but these 
agents are simultaneously directed by a host of needs and desires, some nobler than 
others.3 Furthermore the joyful conclusion of the Eumenides depends heavily on the 
persuasive power of the Olympian gods, sometimes in direct opposition to rules of 
logical inference. In addition to outlining the partly arbitrary character of the estab-
lishment of justice, the first section brings attention to the perseverance in historical 
Athens of privately inflicted sanctioning practices.4
Nevertheless a Nietzschean reading of the Eumenides would not point to 
the arbitrariness present in the (genesis of the) rule of law in order to discredit it. 
Rather, as I argue in the second section, given that it puts an end to the cycle of 
“senseless resentment,” Nietzsche can be read as celebrating the formation of the 
Areopagus. This event is an instance of what he calls in the Genealogy the merciful 
self- overcoming of justice.
Although justice arrives accompanied by joy in the Eumenides, this is not because 
there exists a constitutive relationship between virtue and happiness, as “the Socratic 
Optimist” claims. The Socratic Optimist maintains, inter alia, that suffering is ines-
sential for the transformation of individuals and communities. The intellectual appre-
hension of truths is for him or her sufficient. By contrast, as I argue in the third section, 
the Oresteia evinces commitment to the Nietzschean view that the gates of justice are 
stubborn and in need of the wisdom of woe to pry open. While suffering is essential 
to this view of tragedy— and to this extent Nietzsche appears to retain a significant 
kernel of Schopenhauerianism— pessimistic- cum- resignationist it is not. Given that 
suffering, on the Nietzschean picture, ideally serves as a springboard for a distinctive 
form of human progress, the view on offer warrants the label Aeschylean Optimism.5
Why, though, should we care what Nietzsche or Aeschylus might have thought 
about suffering or justice— not an entirely unfair question. While many aspects of both 
Aeschylus’s and Nietzsche’s attitudes toward justice will be foreign to contemporary 
ears, a goal of this chapter is to turn to progressive voices of centuries past in order to 
illuminate our debate about the role of mercy in criminal law. Accordingly I conclude 
with a discussion of the transformative potential of merciful criminal sanctioning.
Practical Reasonableness and the Apollonian
The just and joyful conclusion of the Eumenides is a result of a transformation 
of suffering endured in the prior parts of the trilogy. That this is not a coolly 
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rational transformation is evident from consideration of the following three fac-
tors: (1) Apollo’s arguments and conduct at Orestes’s trial; (2) Athena’s persuasion 
of the Furies (Erinyes); and (3)  historical evidence that motivates the prevalence 
of passion and partiality in Attic law. I hope to show that Nietzsche’s view of the 
Apollonian principle in Greek tragedy bolsters the appeal to each of these factors, 
which I discuss in turn.
The question of Orestes’s punishment is at the core of the Eumenides. Having 
killed his mother, Clytemnestra— in order to avenge his father and to regain 
the throne from Clytemnestra’s adulterer and co- conspirator, Aegisthus— 
Orestes is now hounded by the Furies, ancient goddesses of (especially familial) 
vengefulness. Under Apollo’s tutelage Orestes requests the counsel of Athena, 
who, upon the arrival of the Furies in Athens, organizes for Orestes something 
novel: a trial.
With a jury of twelve Athenians in place, Apollo offers in defense of Orestes’s 
matricide the following “true parent” argument:
The so- called mother of the child
isn’t the child’s begetter, but only a sort
of nursing soil for the new- born seed.
The man, the one on top, is the true parent,
While she, a stranger, fosters a stranger’s sprout,
if no god blights it. And I can prove it to you:
a father can give birth without a mother.
And here before us is our witness, child
of Olympian Zeus, daughter who never fed
and grew within the darkness of a womb,
a seedling that no goddess could bring forth.6
As proof that the mother is inessential to reproduction, and therefore that Orestes 
cannot have killed a true parent, Apollo refers to Athena’s divine birth. Suspect 
though this argument may appear to the contemporary reader, the idea that the 
mother serves as merely an enabling condition (or “soil”) in reproduction is endorsed 
by Aristotle.7 In spite of the falsity of its conclusion, then, the “true parent” argu-
ment may have been offered (and received) in earnest. We might wonder what evi-
dence could be supplied to justify the argument, but I will not pursue that question 
here. I put this worry aside because the role of the argument is at least partly under-
mined by Apollo’s lack of consistency about the father’s significance as a parent. The 
Furies criticize Zeus’s chaining up of his own father, asking Apollo, “How do you 
square this with your argument?”
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Apollo’s response? “You stinking, hideous filth, shunned by the gods / We can 
break bonds, we can slip out of shackles!” (Eu. 748– 49).
Apollo’s response appears to exploit an ambiguity in what it means to break 
“bonds”: chains on the one hand, and contracts on the other. It is no straightforward 
admission of Olympian dishonesty, but Apollo’s illusive nature is not difficult to 
discern.8 At a later moment in Orestes’s trial, the Furies (who occupy the role of the 
chorus) accuse Apollo of having once tricked their half- sisters out of exacting due 
punishment, that time with the power of wine:
CHORUS LEADER: You did the same thing, too, in Pheres’ house: 
you persuaded the Fates to let men hide from death.
APOLLO: Is it so unjust to treat someone so kindly,
Someone that pious, in his time of need?
CHORUS LEADER: You overturned the age- old covenant
by duping those ancient goddesses with wine.
APOLLO: And when you lose this trial, you’ll vomit all
your venom at the ones you hate— quite harmlessly.
(Eu. 842– 49)
Apollo’s tendency toward pragmatically driven deception is well accounted for on 
Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy. Nietzsche claims that two principles are interwoven in 
tragic drama: the Dionysian and the Apollonian, where Apollo is the “ruler over the 
beautiful illusion of the inner world of fantasy … the imaged world of dreams” (BT 
1, 2). While the Dionysian principle maintains that ours is a world awash with suf-
fering, unconcerned with human happiness, tragic art presents us with this terrible 
aspect of life but wrapped in the “pleasurable illusion of dreams” that the Apollonian 
affords (BT 4). The logic of dreams permits non sequiturs, and while Apollo never 
admits to having double standards, he is self- conscious about the efficacy of anger 
in coming to an adequate judgment in the trial. In the course of defending Orestes 
before Athena, Apollo claims he has “spoken as I have to whip up anger in you who 
are called to set this matter right” (Eu. 747). Athena continues Apollo’s trend insofar 
as she is unconcerned with nonaffectively convincing the Furies, but her tack is one 
of spiritedness and persuasion (rather than deceptiveness and insult).
First, Athena prefaces her own vote regarding Orestes’s culpability thus: “I acqui-
esce to the man in all matters [to d’arsen aino panta] (except that I choose not to 
marry) and I  take the father’s side with my whole thumos [hapanti thumoi]” (Eu. 
855– 56).9 While the spirited element of the soul is sometimes characterized in 
the Republic as irrational and antagonistic to peacemaking,10 we need only con-
sult Homer for evidence of a conception of thumos as politically concerned and 
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responsive to reasons. Consider Odysseus’s manner of deciding how to act virtu-
ously: “O woe is me, what am I to endure? It is a great act of cowardice if I should 
take flight, terrified by the numbers of men; but it will be worse if I am taken alone; 
the son of Kronos put the other Danaans to flight. But why has my dear θυμός [thu-
mos] discussed these things in me? I know that cowards leave the battle, but he who 
excels in battle must stand his ground strongly, whether he is hit or hits another.”11 
Personified as an interlocutor, Odysseus’s thumos contributes in deliberation over 
the course of action that he can “stand behind”; “it invigorates him to use his life in 
a manner that risks life in an honorable way.”12 Similarly, in appealing to thumos in 
casting her ballot for Orestes’s acquittal, Athena displays action that is both affec-
tive and concerned with political reasons. That is, Athena’s action is not “rational” 
in a narrow, nonaffective sense, nor is it irrational.
There is another way in which Athena’s spiritedness is indispensable for the 
Oresteia’s joyful conclusion. After the ballots are counted in Orestes’s favor, Athena 
makes three unsuccessful attempts to pacify the Furies. In the final, successful 
monologue Athena’s conciliatory offer is put as follows:
But if you hold in awe Persuasion’s glory,
the power of my tongue to soothe and enchant,
you might live here with us… .
The way
is free for you to be a landholder here,
enjoying honor justly and forever. (Eu. 1030– 38)
Having threatened to express their rage on the entirety of Athens, the Furies are 
gradually appeased. Like her brother and “spokesman for Zeus” (Eu. 21), Athena 
is a herald of Apollonian activity. As Martha C.  Nussbaum notes, for Nietzsche 
“Apollonian activity is not detached and coolly contemplative, but a response to 
an urgent human need, namely the need to demarcate an intrinsically unordered 
world.”13 The relevant need in the Eumenides is the transformation of vengeance— 
a chain of vengeance that had claimed the lives of Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, 
Cassandra, arguably all of Troy, Iphigenia, and most of the Argive fleet. The momen-
tousness of this transformation consists in the detail that, in each instance, ven-
geance had presented itself as a demand and expression of justice (e.g., Clytemnestra 
and Aegisthus both justify and explain their acts of vengeance by appeal to justice 
[Ag. 1637, 1814, 1847– 52]).14 While the Furies aim to continue indefinitely this 
“time- honored” retributive cycle and “suck the half- caked gore out of [Orestes’s] 
living flesh” (Eu. 302– 303), their vengeful enthusiasm is gradually, very gradually, 
curbed.
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I have been arguing that the transition from the vengeful order to the legal order does 
not involve the elimination of a passionate response to crime. According to Danielle 
Allen, the porousness of the boundary between vengeance and punishment is evident 
too in historical Athens. For example, Athenian democracy permitted “private citizens 
[to] execute some forms of punishment without passing through the court system at 
all. For instance, a private citizen was within the bounds of law if he killed a thief or 
adulterer whom he caught in his house at night.”15 Conversely, as David Cohen argues, 
the civic institutions of punishment were “developed precisely so as to provide public 
means of carrying on private wars of vendetta: ‘litigation … involved the opportunity 
to contest one’s claims to honor with those of one’s rivals.’ ”16 So, in addition to being 
absent in the trilogy, we have historical reasons for maintaining that a link between just 
punishment and the “dispassionate” would have been foreign to Aeschylus.
None of this, it should be emphasized, is meant to discredit the grounds of the 
joy we find in the Eumenides’s conclusion. First, given that Athena’s spiritedness is 
keenly responsive to political reasons, it is only out of misunderstanding that we 
might demand— as has been demanded in California v. Brown, for instance17— that 
deliberation over sentencing be free of sentiment. (I return to this point below.) 
Second, and more important, against the backdrop of human sacrifice, matricide, 
patricide, decade- long war, and psychological torture spanning the Oresteia, the 
arbitrariness present in this “Apollonian power of transfiguration” (BT 25) can be 
no objection to it. How can arbitrariness count as a strike against the Areopagus’s 
worth if its establishment, and the audience’s appreciation of its establishment, makes 
“life possible and worth living” (BT 2)? This reference to the lives of the audience 
is meant to mark Nietzsche’s insistence that the transformative power of tragedy 
be operative on two levels: in its content (the Furies and Athens are transformed) 
and in the form it takes in the audience’s mind; in experiencing an overcoming of 
extreme suffering, Nietzsche maintains that we the viewers will ideally undergo a 
transformation of consciousness that makes possible not only the endurance of the 
terribleness of life but a love of it, no longer construed as overwhelmingly terrible.18 
That is, Apollo is representative of rendering beautiful life’s dreadful elements, and 
for this reason “existence under the bright sunshine of such gods is regarded as desir-
able in itself ” (BT 3).
Although the Apollonian principle consists in the beautification of life, which 
Nietzsche frequently characterizes in terms of “illusion” (BT 3, 7, 16, 18), it is no 
mere escape from “the real world.”19 “Apollonian art,” as Julian Young puts it, 
“acknowledges and does not eliminate from consciousness the terrible in life.”20 For 
this reason the love of life that the Greeks inspire is no deluded attitude; its ethical 
significance is manifest in Nietzsche’s discussion of justice’s relation to mercy and 
resentment. Apollonian transfiguration does alter our view of human action, but as 
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I argue in the next section, this consists in a correction rather than a mere alteration 
of the default mode of perceiving human action.
From Ressentiment to Mercy
Over the course of the Eumenides the Furies undergo an important transforma-
tion. This is a transformation from what Nietzsche calls an orientation of ressenti-
ment to an orientation of mercy. It thus comprises the “self- overcoming of justice.” 
While discussion of Aeschylus’s work in the Birth of Tragedy centers on Prometheus, 
Nietzsche there expresses reverence for the “profoundly Aeschylean demand for jus-
tice” (BT 9),21 which can be profitably extended to the Eumenides. My suggestion 
is that Nietzsche would welcome the just and joyful end of the Eumenides partly 
because it is put in the service of reshaping (particularly rendering more construc-
tive) attitudes of ressentiment. Nietzsche’s own view, as Richard Posner aptly puts it, 
is that there is a “relation of substitution between law and vengeance,”22 a substitu-
tion that is outlined in the Genealogy’s second essay, and here it is worth quoting 
Nietzsche at length:
Law represents on earth … the struggle against the reactive feelings … to 
impose measure and bounds upon the excesses of the reactive pathos and to 
compel it to come to terms. Wherever justice is practiced and maintained one 
sees a stronger power seeking a means of putting an end to the senseless raging 
of ressentiment among the weaker powers that stand under it (whether they 
be groups of individuals)— partly by taking the object of ressentiment out of 
the hands of revenge, partly by substituting for revenge the struggle against 
the enemies of peace and order, partly by devising and in some cases imposing 
settlements, partly by elevating certain equivalents for injuries into norms to 
which from then on ressentiment is once and for all directed. The most decisive 
act, however, that the supreme power performs and accomplishes against the 
predominance of grudges and rancor— it always takes this action as soon as it 
is in any way strong enough to do so— is the institution of law, the imperative 
declaration of what in general counts as permitted, as just, in its eyes, and what 
counts as forbidden, as unjust… . From now on the eye is trained to an ever-
more impersonal evaluation of the deed. (GM II: 11)
The establishment of legal institutions provides the community with means for 
redirecting and thereby rendering more productive the energy underlying the com-
munity members’ “senseless raging of ressentiment.” I follow Nietzsche in his use of 
 
22 Criminal Histories
the French (ressentiment) since the phenomenon of interest differs markedly from 
what we mean by “resentment.”23 A brief word on this difference will be of use. First, 
we usually take resentment to be an emotion reflecting the violation of a demand 
made on members within a single moral community.24 Nietzschean ressentiment, by 
contrast, is an “emotional orientation” and serves as the basis for a range of moral 
emotions. Second, ressentiment involves an asymmetry between classes that resent-
ment need not involve. Jay Wallace captures both of these features when he says 
that the orientation of ressentiment consists in “a kind of focused hatred that grows 
out of a structural comparative deprivation.”25 Third, part of what Nietzsche finds 
objectionable about ressentiment is that its source in privation is unacknowledged. 
More specifically this orientation essentially involves self- deception, particularly 
repressed vengefulness (GM I: 7).
This last aspect may sound strange given how vocal the Furies are about their 
desire to exact revenge on Orestes. Bernard Reginster’s elucidation of the connection 
between self- deception and ressentiment is particularly helpful here. As Reginster puts 
it, “The ‘[person] of ressentiment’ is … divided between two sets of desires (and val-
ues): the apparent desires (and values) which he has as a result of his revaluation, and 
the real desires (and values) which are ‘repressed’ but nonetheless covertly motivate 
his revaluation.”26 In the case of the Furies, it is not difficult to see that a deep longing 
for recognition underpins much of their vengeful behavior. In complaining about the 
Olympian gods, the Furies say, “None of them would feast with us at the same table; 
we have no part in festivals where white robes are worn” (Eu. 415– 17). The desire for 
Olympian recognition that this complaint expresses renders intelligible the warmth 
with which the Furies eventually ease into their crimson robes. At last their wish to 
be esteemed by the Olympian gods is fulfilled. That their desire for graciousness has 
been previously repressed is suggested by the following avowals of pride in pettiness:
Adept at devising,
Unmatched alike in remembering wrong done
As in repaying it;
Awful to men, deaf to their pleas,
Detested and dishonored we fulfill
our given office; cut off
from the gods, we in the dark slime make
the path rough both for those who live in sunlight
and for those in sunlessness. (Eu. 462– 70)
On the surface the Furies profess that their lowliness is a virtue, a kind of achieve-
ment. Yet given the lack of status that this lowliness implies, by postulating a 
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repressed desire for Olympian recognition we can better understand the Furies’ 
pensive though eventually wholehearted acceptance of Athena’s offers of honor (and 
its concomitant benefits of friendship, sacrificial offerings, and worship). We need 
not even rule out that the Furies adjust the relative value they attribute to merciful 
action partly in virtue of the sheer difficulty of maintaining their vengeful resolution 
in the face of Athena’s tempting offer. While it is sometimes rational to develop 
tendencies to avoid reconsidering our resolutions, the mechanism underlying this 
sort of “judgment- shift” is not by itself irrational.27
We might nonetheless worry about the motivation of the Furies. I have claimed 
that they become merciful, but if their vengeful desires are merely overpowered 
by desire for honor, their change in mind is driven by self- interest. Perhaps they 
only appear, and aim to appear, merciful. Worries of this sort are ill- founded. 
The fact that the Furies hunger after honor does not rule out their acting merci-
fully. As Nietzsche claims elsewhere in the Genealogy, the very transition from 
strict retributive justice— and the Furies repeatedly insist that they are moti-
vated by what is “just” (e.g., Eu. 312, 361, 838)— to a model of justice concerned 
with the well- being of the whole marks a move toward mercy: “The justice which 
begins with ‘everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged,’ ends 
by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, 
as does every good thing on earth, by overcoming itself. This self- overcoming of 
justice:  one knows the beautiful name it has given itself— mercy” (GM II:10). 
Even if the Furies exercise self- restraint partly from self- interest and require a 
wave of persuasion to adopt a merciful stance, Nietzsche’s point is that the con-
tingent factors that contribute to the adoption of the merciful attitude need not 
discredit its status. Athena’s conciliatory power might have been necessary for 
the Furies to abandon their long- standing retributive resolution, but consider 
by comparison the young man’s being gradually persuaded by his peers to aban-
don his childhood resolution to never be susceptible to the charm of females. 
“Surely,” as Richard Holton claims, “maintaining that resolution in the face if 
his later attraction will not be rational.”28 Nor need it be right to construe the 
contributing role of his peers as simply providing a motive from peer pressure 
when the young man changes his mind.
While the cynical reader of the Eumenides may claim that the desire for honor 
rather than mercy is what really motivates the Furies to yield in their plans of seek-
ing retribution, I see no reason to choose one over the other. We should note that 
even prior to the trial, the Furies claim that they need to exact vengeance in order 
to preserve their honor (Eu. 379). For this reason the “sweeping denigration of any 
self- interested or desire- based human motives”— in other words, the insistence on 
“motivational purity”— is foreign to the world I am considering.29
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This point furnishes us with tools for responding to a more powerful interpre-
tative objection— namely, that by highlighting discussions of mercy and joy I am 
presenting an anesthetized Nietzsche, a Nietzsche stripped of his familiar commit-
ment to Thucydidean power politics, a Nietzsche who has forgotten that “justice 
is thus requital and exchange under the presupposition of an approximately equal 
power position: revenge therefore belongs originally within the domain of justice, 
it is an exchange… . Justice goes back naturally to the viewpoint of an enlightened 
self- preservation, thus to the egoism of the reflection: ‘to what end should I injure 
myself uselessly and perhaps even then not achieve my goal?’— so much for the ori-
gin of justice” (HAH 92). Yet there is no inconsistency in Nietzsche’s claiming, on 
the one hand, that justice has its origin in “repayment and exchange,” the homeland 
of revenge, and on other hand, that we are well- served by transfiguring this origi-
nal condition of justice; this is exactly what the merciful self- overcoming of justice 
requires. Again the “relation between law and vengeance is roughly one of substitu-
tion.”30 Furthermore we can accept this Nietzschean point about justice accepting 
Nietzsche’s undemocratic restriction of the scope of the “we” that would be well- 
served by the self- overcoming of justice. This is to resist Nietzsche’s view— as char-
acterized by Rawls— that the goods of justice and liberty are to be subordinated to 
those of human excellence in art and culture, the sources of which are “higher types” 
of individuals.31 (In other words, we can maintain, as Derek Parfit has recently 
claimed, that “Nietzsche was a brilliant thinker, who made many claims that are 
original, important and true,” while insisting that “when we encourage people to 
read Nietzsche’s books, we should admit that Nietzsche made some utterly appall-
ing claims.”32)
Given, then, that neither Aeschylus nor Nietzsche has a view of motivation that 
precludes partly self- interested behavior from being merciful (and so concerned 
with the civic good), there is no reason not to take the Eumenides at their word 
when they say:
Let citizens
give joy for joy,
loving the common good,
hating a common foe:
they’ll cure most ills this way. (Eu. 1132– 36)
A way of further resolving the apparent tension between being motivated by both 
mercy and honor is to look at the level not merely of action but of character: Why 
not think that being a merciful person is a way of being honorable? If we accept 
this idea, we have a concrete way of describing the longevity of the transformation 
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of the Furies into Eumenides (or “Gracious Ones,” as Athena’s appellation would 
have it). Furthermore, given that Nietzsche’s “person of ressentiment" is self- deceived 
and so, as Reginster maintains, lacks a trait essential to Nietzsche’s view of "nobil-
ity" of character— namely integrity of self— we have grounds for thinking that 
mercy and honor are not only compatible but in this case interdependent.33 It is 
not just the decision of the Furies that changes; in unifying their behavior with 
a previously repressed and rational desire (namely a desire to cooperate with the 
Olympian gods), they themselves become honorable (de facto and de jure). In sub-
ordinating their aggressive drives to their hitherto repressed desire for recognition, 
the Furies undergo a sublimation that mirrors their newly formed cohesive relation-
ship toward the state. As Ken Gemes maintains, sublimation, which is integral to 
psychological health on Nietzsche’s view, is characterized by “integration or unifica-
tion, while pathological symptoms involve splitting off or disintegration.”34 Given 
that the transformation of the Furies consists in a change in affective orientation, it is 
no mystery why, as Nussbaum maintains, the Eumenides come to express a unified 
range of benevolent sentiments toward the state and its citizens.35 In coming to view 
their previous actions as no longer honorable, the Furies undergo a transformation 
of attitudes that displays the structure of a recently canvassed (and empirically well- 
supported) honor- based model of moral revolution.36
So much for compatibility of mercy with honor; let’s now turn briefly to justice. 
Even if mercy and honor are compatible, this does not by itself render intelligible the 
compatibility of mercy with justice. The problem is this: if justice demands deserved 
punishment, and mercy involves punishment that is less than deserved, mercy seems 
to be unjust. How can the supererogatory nature of mercy be included within the 
realm of justice while remaining supererogatory? Jeffrie Murphy puts the dilemma 
thus: “Mercy is either a vice (injustice) or redundant (a part of justice).”37 Given that 
the Furies originally seek retribution in the name of justice, how can their leniency 
be anything other than unjust?
We will be well served by briefly attending to the history of the concepts of justice 
(dike) and mercy (epiekeia). On Anaximander’s use of the concept (the oldest avail-
able to us), justice (dike) follows the same sort of regularity that natural processes 
are taken to exhibit. Like the order of nature, the just judge is not to be moved in 
the face of ostensible mitigating circumstances. As Nussbaum puts this understand-
ing of justice, “The world of strict dike is a harsh and symmetrical world, in which 
order and design are preserved with exceptionless clarity. After summer comes fall, 
after fall comes winter, after day comes night; the fact that Agamemnon was not 
the killer of Thyestes’ children is as irrelevant to dike as the fact that the night did 
not deliberately aggress against the day.”38 On the one hand, this natural symme-
try guards against discrimination and guarantees treating like cases alike. Yet I 
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cannot help thinking that in at least some cases indiscrimination is tantamount 
to insensitivity to factors unusually relevant in deciding fair punishment. “Justice 
as revenge,” claims Posner, “has no means of distinguishing between culpable and 
justifiable injuries or even for developing the distinction. Liability tends therefore 
to be absolute.”39 This uncompromising character of retribution is especially salient 
if we put the contrast as one between (1) calculable and unthinking punishment— 
Anaximander’s nature, I take it, does not deliberate; and (2) punishment informed 
by perception of the relevant particulars.
Given the minimal assumption that the judgment of crime, unlike the unfolding 
of the seasons, ought to be a cognitive process, the Aristotelian account of merciful 
punishment should strike us as attractive: Aristotle “define[s] equity as a kind of 
justice, but a kind that is superior to and frequently opposed to another sort, namely 
strict legal justice… . Equity [or mercy] may be regarded as a ‘correcting’ and ‘com-
pleting’ of legal justice.”40 On a model of punishment that takes seriously mercy or 
equity (epiekeia), the “relevant particulars” that the judge is responsive to are broadly 
those classed as “mitigating circumstances.” The merciful attitude to human action 
recognizes that the stakes in punishment are much higher than night’s following 
day or autumn’s following summer— none of these natural events involve parties 
that care about their own well- being or the well- being of society. Nevertheless, 
since this care is manifest in intelligent perception, the judge’s verdict will not aban-
don the demands of impartiality. That is, the cognitive nature of merciful punish-
ment guarantees that there is something for the merciful judge to get right.
The Aristotelian view that just punishment sometimes requires careful perception 
of the circumstances is well- captured by Aeschylus’s imagery of the Furies’ transi-
tion from darkness to light. In their default retributive mode the Furies self- identify 
as “luckless daughters of the Night” (Eu. 921). In this mode they are wholly blind to 
differences between justifiability and culpability. By contrast, under the tutelage of 
“All- seeing Zeus” (Eu. 1223) the Eumenides, now dressed in radiant crimson robes, 
become torchbearers for a humane mode of punishment. It is true that the mitigat-
ing factors of Orestes’s case are not what motivate the Furies’ leniency— and this 
marks an important disanalogy between the Furies and the merciful judge— but 
once transformed, the Eumenides are able to recognize factors of this sort. It is from 
their new vantage point that they make proclamations like “I ban, too, the untimely 
killing of young men; and you gods who possess the power to do so, let young girls 
find husbands” (Eu. 1117– 21). Having stepped into new light— the light of the mer-
ciful orientation— the Furies bear the responsibility of “oversee[ing] the lives of 
men” (Eu. 1083– 84).
Along with the “perceptual shift” of the Furies comes a newfound ability for 
expression. As Nussbaum notes, early in the Eumenides the Furies make repetitive 
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canine- like utterances: “Their only words are ‘get him get him get him get him’ (labe 
labe etc.), as close to a doggy hunting cry as the genre allows.”41 These cries stand in 
stark contrast to the poetic outpourings of the transformed goddesses.
Metaphors of “entering the light,” “seeing with new eyes,” “finding grace,” and 
so on have a characteristically optimistic air. This should give us pause. Given, that 
is, that Nietzsche takes rationalism and optimism to form a union in Socratic opti-
mism, the latter must be sufficiently unlike the optimism of the Oresteia. In the next 
and final section I distinguish these two forms of optimism and outline the upshot 
of my reading for the debate about mercy and criminal law.
Varieties of Optimism
Optimism is for Nietzsche a pejorative term associated with Socratic rationalism. 
Indeed what Nietzsche calls “Socratic optimism” comprises a set of commitments 
about happiness, truth, and virtue that he takes to signal the demise of Greek 
tragedy. In spite of this Nietzsche is an optimist of a particular kind, namely an 
Aeschylean optimist. Let me explain.
According to optimism in the Socratic sense, suffering is dispensable for flour-
ishing. “If we had access to the right sort of knowledge,” so the Socratic optimist 
maintains, “the terrible consequences could have been avoided, and we would be 
better off for it.” More generally this is a view according to which knowledge is suf-
ficient for virtue and virtue for happiness. Nietzsche’s opposition to Socratic opti-
mism rests on its blindness to the truth of the tragic: “Consider the consequences 
of the Socratic maxims:  ‘Virtue is knowledge; man sins only from ignorance; he 
who is virtuous is happy.’ In these three basic forms of optimism lies the death of 
tragedy. For now the virtuous hero must be a dialectician; now there must be a nec-
essary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality; now 
the transcendental justice of Aeschylus is degraded to the superficial and insolent 
principle of ‘poetic justice’ ” (BT 14). Optimism of this sort is antitragic because it 
aims to eliminate the significance of external contingencies for happiness. If virtue 
is sufficient for happiness, all unhappiness or suffering must arise from the sufferer’s 
own vice. We need not follow Nietzsche in blaming the disintegration of tragedy on 
Euripides— whom Nietzsche brands the “poet of aesthetic Socratism” (BT 12)42— in 
order to appreciate his insight that the Socratic view of suffering is only amplified in 
the modern (quasi- ) Christian worldview. In the latter, as a matter of divine fairness 
regarding desert, one’s degree of blameworthiness is construed as proportionate to 
one’s degree of suffering. As Nietzsche puts it in Daybreak, “Misfortune and guilt— 
Christianity has placed these two things on a balance… . But this is not antique, 
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and that is why Greek tragedy, which speaks so much yet in so different a sense of 
misfortune and guilt, is a great liberator of the spirit in a way in which the ancients 
themselves could not feel it… . In antiquity there still existed actual misfortune; 
only in Christendom did everything become punishment, well- deserved punish-
ment” (78).43 Indeed it follows that if virtue is sufficient for happiness and vice is 
blameworthy, then all unhappiness must arise from actions that are blameworthy. 
What is mistaken about the optimism of the Socratic(- cum- Christian) worldview 
is the simple and well- known truth that bad things happen to good people and that 
we sometimes suffer in ways grossly disproportionate to our blameworthiness. In 
addition to separating happiness from virtue, however, Nietzsche severs virtue from 
knowledge. That Nietzsche takes happiness, virtue, and knowledge to be mutually 
dissociable, however, should not surprise us. After all, like Aeschylus, Nietzsche 
holds that there is knowledge to be had from suffering.
The connection between wisdom and suffering abounds in Nietzsche’s corpus. 
Consider his claim that everything that makes life valuable— “for instance: virtue 
[Tugend] art, music, dance, reason, intellect”— arises out of subjection to strict rules, 
out of “obedience for a long time in a single direction” (BGE 188).44 Nietzsche’s view 
on the wisdom wrought from suffering is particularly vivid in his discussion of 
Dionysus, specifically of the “chorus of the Greek tragedy, the symbol of the whole 
excited Dionysian throng”:  “In its vision this chorus beholds its lord and master 
Dionysus and is therefore eternally the serving chorus: it sees how the god suffers 
and glorifies himself and therefore does not itself act. But while its attitude toward 
the god is wholly one of service, it is nevertheless the highest, namely the Dionysian, 
expression of nature and therefore pronounces in its rapture, as nature does, oracles 
and wise- sayings:  sharing his suffering it also shares something of his wisdom and 
proclaims the truth from the heart of the world” (BT 8). Although Nietzsche posits 
a deep union between suffering and wisdom, he should not be construed as claiming 
that suffering is somehow sufficient for wisdom. Sympathetic though he is to human 
impulse to render meaningful one’s suffering (GM II: 7), the optimism he endorses 
is not one according to which suffering inherently justifies (or even pushes in the 
direction of justifying) itself through its consequences, by, say, generating “more over-
all wisdom.” Indeed such a view would bear too close a similarity to Leibnizian opti-
mism, on which, owing to the rational structure of the universe, every local negative 
event is a necessary component of a globally maximal positive state of affairs— or, 
as Voltaire’s Pangloss puts it, “All is for the best in this best of all possible worlds.”45
Apart from its untenability as a reading of Nietzsche, this view displays a deep 
insensitivity to disproportionate levels of suffering. In the case of the Eumenides, is 
it unimaginable that Athens could have established rule of law without the Argive 
fleet entirely destroying Troy? Or that Nietzsche might have produced great work 
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with one or two fewer “torments that go with an uninterrupted three- day migraine, 
accompanied by laborious vomiting of phlegm” (EH I: 1)? Tempting though it is to 
speculate over Nietzsche’s own redemptive self- narrative and its psychological contri-
butions to his late- career explosion of productivity, this is a topic for another paper.46
Leaving aside the question of the sufficient amount of suffering needed for “wis-
dom from woe,” it is difficult to deny that Orestes grasps something of significant 
truth because he has lived through the tumult of the House of Atreus (even if part 
of it is lived in exile). Seeing what he grasps will help get in view the kind of suffering 
at issue in Aeschylean optimism. Consider Orestes’s claim “I have been schooled by 
my own suffering” (Eu. 319). Orestes’s assertion is noteworthy in the context of his 
predecessors’ disavowals of wrongful action. According to E. R. Dodds, Orestes’s 
difference from Clytemnestra and Agamemnon consists in an understanding of a 
peculiar sort:
It is not that Orestes is humble where [Clytemnestra] is arrogant, or that his 
motives are “purer” than hers; he has simple human motives, which he does not 
conceal (299– 304). The deeper difference is that the divine purpose, of which 
both Agamemnon and Clytemnestra were unconscious and guilty agents, 
is for Orestes something consciously known and humbly, though not easily, 
accepted. He is aware that his act is a crime, even before it is committed (903, 
cf. 106– 17 and 1029); but receiving it as a duty, he stands as a type of all those 
who take upon themselves “the necessary guilt of human action.” Orestes has 
not merely suffered his situation, he has understood it and in a sense mastered 
it; it is his learning which makes him worthy of salvation.47
We get a particularly powerful example of Orestes’s tragic understanding in his 
expression of grief over his matricide— grief he feels in spite of taking his act to 
be inevitable and justified. Shortly after murdering Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, 
Orestes articulates his sorrow thus:
Now I am here to mourn,
Holding this web that killed my father. Still,
I grieve for what was done, for what was suffered,
And for all our race, shouldering, as I do,
A filthy and unenviable triumph. (Lb. 1147– 51)
Unlike Agamemnon, who, from the practical necessity of sacrificing Iphigenia, con-
cludes that the act was right, Orestes appreciates that the impossibility of fulfilling 
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two inconsistent ethical demands does not relieve him from the pain of having com-
mitted a serious wrong.48 That is, Orestes understands, as Bernard Williams puts it, 
“If I eventually choose for one side of the conflict rather than the other, this is a pos-
sible ground of regret… . These states do not depend … on whether I am convinced 
that in the choice I made I acted for the best; I can be convinced of this, yet have 
these regrets.”49 Orestes’s mourning is especially noteworthy given that he is told in 
unambiguous terms by Apollo that the god himself is responsible for Clytemnestra’s 
death: “I ordered him to kill his mother. I am responsible” (Eu. 675– 76). In spite of 
Apollo’s symbolic alleviation of Orestes’s accountability, Orestes does not attempt 
to disown the fact that his mother died by his own hand.50
Why, though, should we take Orestes’s anguish to speak in favor of a Nietzschean, 
in contrast to a Socratic, reading of the Eumenides? In answering this question it is 
important to recognize that for Socrates too suffering need not be bad. For exam-
ple, in Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates’s argument for the powerlessness of tyrants rests on 
the principle that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it (469b– 474d). 
There is thus a sense in which Socrates can agree with Nietzsche that suffering may 
sometimes be painful without being bad. Although agreement on this general point 
narrows the contrast between Socrates and Nietzsche, the Socratic view of suffer-
ing’s value is nonetheless substantially different from that evinced in the Eumenides. 
Note that for Socrates suffering is valuable only comparatively: given the option to 
either (1) harm someone or (2) be harmed, Socrates thinks we should accept (2), since 
(1) is shameful and so must be worse. By contrast suffering’s value for Aeschylus cuts 
across the distinction between committing and suffering harm. Given that Orestes 
not only undergoes harm but commits it— there is blood on his hands— the value 
of his suffering cannot be of the narrowly moral sort outlined by Socrates. Rather 
it consists in bringing about a tragic form of understanding, one that is decidedly 
anti- Socratic (given the Socratic union of happiness, virtue, and truth).
The importance of Orestes’s understanding, however, is secondary to the wis-
dom wrought from suffering by the Eumenides. It is the latter who enable the long- 
standing tradition of retribution to be reshaped. The cessation of the Atridae cycle 
of vengeance acquires the status of political progress in its serving as the occasion 
for Athens to initiate rule of law. Rule of law provides institutional measures for 
substantially improving the well- being of Athenian citizens, and it is this presence 
of human progress that most clearly warrants the name Aeschylean optimism.
Aeschylean optimism differs substantially from its Socratic nephew in that the 
former places suffering at its center. For all this, however, we should resist pessi-
mistic readings of Nietzsche on tragedy. For example, according to Williams’s 
“Nietzschean” view of tragedy (at least the sort that qualifies as “stark fiction”), 
tragic theater presents us with the bleak truth of the “inexplicable necessity” of 
31Mercy at the Areopagus
“extreme, undeserved, and uncompensated suffering,” for which “there is no justi-
fication.” Williams is right to hold that Nietzsche thinks life abounds with unde-
served suffering, but why should this lead us to accept Williams’s suggestion that 
tragedy’s function consists in “lay[ing] fictional horrors before us in a way that elicits 
attitudes we cannot take towards real horrors”?51
It is worth appreciating why one might be tempted to endorse, in a Nietzschean 
spirit, a pessimistic reading of tragic drama’s function. Like his educator and exem-
plar, Arthur Schopenhauer, Nietzsche holds that life is not fundamentally fair; pace 
the Stoics (BGE 9) and other rationalists, the world displays no internal rational 
structure. It is we who justify the sea of suffering that threatens to swallow us, as it 
has swallowed our friends and forerunners.52 On Schopenhauer’s view, however, we 
are not simply vulnerable to suffering; humans are essentially and inevitably suffer-
ers, deserving of contempt as a species, yet individually deserving pity.
Nietzsche’s indebtedness to Schopenhauer, however, consists not in mimicry but 
more valuably in his “think[ing] pessimism through to its depths.” In immersing 
himself fully in the pessimistic worldview, Nietzsche eventually endorses the oppo-
site world orientation: “Anyone like me, who has tried for a long time and with some 
enigmatic desire, to think pessimism through to its depths and to deliver it from 
the half- Christian, half- German narrowness and naiveté with which it has finally 
presented itself to this century, namely in the form of the Schopenhauerian phi-
losophy … will have inadvertently opened his eyes to the inverse ideal: to the ideal 
of the most high- spirited, vital, world- affirming individual” (BGE 56). Elsewhere 
Nietzsche claims that a serious consideration of pessimism results in the position’s 
own “self- refutation” (TI IX: 36). Although he does not say exactly why this is so, 
part of the reason is plausibly that acceptance of thoroughgoing pessimism under-
mines one’s grounds for issuing prescriptions. According to Schopenhauer, because 
we are a contemptible species of inevitable sufferers, we ought to “injure no one; on 
the contrary, help everyone as much as you can.”53 But Schopenhauer’s pity- based 
ethical project is difficult to motivate if we accept the view that humanity is essen-
tially bad.54 What reason can I possibly have for pitying my neighbor if he is essen-
tially contemptible? In short, the pursuit of caring for and helping others appears to 
be a lost cause if we adopt Schopenhauerian pessimism.
Pessimism, in other words, provides little basis for avoiding resignation in the face 
of life’s demands. What is essential to the view found in Nietzsche and Aeschylus, 
by contrast, is the drive for a distinctive kind of improvement. This drive is one for 
which pessimism cannot adequately account. Pace those who take life to be inher-
ently and irredeemably bad, for the Aeschylean optimist there are things we can do, 
within mutable limits, to make life better.55 Here is where the relevance of my discus-
sion of mercy to criminal law surfaces.
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We can imagine a version of the Oresteia in which Athena, upon reflecting on 
the nature of the Furies, judges them to be irreparably vicious. If this were Athena’s 
attitude, there would be little reason to think she would endeavor to persuade the 
Furies to take up the values of Athens as their own. Fortunately, however, Athena’s 
actions are expressive of Aeschylean optimism: in spite of the Furies’ formidable 
track record of malice and blood thirst, Athena recognizes them as beings with 
whom one can reason. My suggestion is that the “normative hope” that Athena 
displays toward the Furies ought to serve as a kind of model for merciful sanction-
ing practices.56
What does this suggestion amount to? First, it commends a model of punish-
ment that is psychologically more robust than that of many deterrence- based views. 
The Aeschylean judge will not view criminals merely in behaviorist terms, “treat-
ing them as objects that through their behavior generate either good or bad social 
consequences,”57 but as persons with historically rich moral psychological lives. On 
the level of behavior Orestes differs little from Agamemnon, but when we introduce 
remorse alongside considerations of Orestes’s circumstances, it becomes possible to 
view him with different eyes. I hasten to add that the merciful judge need not ignore 
the deterrent function of criminal law. Indeed the formation of the Areopagus can be 
endorsed on purely consequentialist grounds, but a virtue of a hybrid view (i.e., one 
that takes seriously merciful criminal sanctioning) is its ability to render intelligible 
the importance of the judge’s understanding the inner life of the criminal. In the 
Eumenides an understanding of the nature of the Furies’ ressentiment is surely vital 
for, inter alia, appreciating the latent desire for Olympian recognition.
Empirical work gathered by Paul Robinson suggests another possible avenue for 
defending merciful criminal punishment on consequentialist grounds. Merciful 
criminal sanctioning might more accurately track lay intuitions about proper pun-
ishment, such that it “therefore better enhances the criminal justice system’s moral 
credibility, and thereby its crime- control effectiveness.”58 Thus even if we take the 
deterrent function of criminal law to be a sole consideration, we should nonetheless 
pursue merciful sanctioning.
I want to suggest, however, that one lesson of the Eumenides consists in its mak-
ing salient that more matters to us than the deterrent effects of law. This “something 
more” is captured by the value we perceive in the very transformation that the Furies 
undergo. To make this point let’s focus on another kind of merciful sanctioning 
that has transformative potential. I have in mind college- in- prison programs. While 
it is true that programs of this sort drastically reduce recidivism and resultantly 
cut taxpayer spending on incarcerating prisoners (with an average annual cost of 
roughly $29,000 per person in the United States, which has a prison population of 
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over 2.3 million),59 the merciful judge cares about something more than these (admit-
tedly nonnegligible) consequences.
This “something more,” I  think, consists in the merciful judge’s caring about 
what “went wrong” in the criminal’s civic integration, in the judge’s normatively 
hoping that it go better. Furthermore, without such normative hope we have no 
reason to prefer (1) a world in which the state’s citizens care about the civic good 
to (2) a world in which they don’t, provided that the consequences, economic and 
otherwise, are identical for (1) and (2). “Structural comparative deprivation,” recall, 
was a part of the explanation for the orientation of ressentiment that consumed the 
Furies. Over and above the costs and benefits involved in criminal sanctioning, the 
merciful judge strives to understand how and under what circumstances citizens 
feel and think such that they can flourish as responsible and admirable citizens. In 
other words, the merciful judge acknowledges that the importance of net deter-
rence effects is parasitic on our experience of the value of another’s humanity.
Nietzsche’s discussion of the practical significance of the merciful attitude sug-
gests that tragic fiction is well- positioned to teach us about the stakes involved 
in nurturing certain virtues. For this reason, although Nietzsche does claim that 
tragedy represents some of the immense suffering in human life, his reverence for 
the “profoundly Aeschylean demand for justice” (BT 9)  suggests that, in spite of 
its immensity, this suffering should arouse attitudes other than dismay. This will 
not surprise us if we keep in mind Nietzsche’s many invocations to self- overcoming 
(D 192; BGE 61, 257; TI X: 38) and self- creating (TI IX: 10; HAH Pref. 3). Indeed 
reflection on tragedy can provide us with ethical directives for reasonably overcom-
ing some of the default sources of our suffering. There are measures to be taken 
toward transforming our circumstances. The merciful self- overcoming of retribu-
tive justice is just one example.
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shackled beneath the state, their “assimilation” amounting simply to another way of repressing 
the state’s aggressive mode. Such views fail to do justice to either the abundance of transfor-
mative idioms and imagery in the text or the historical milieu in which Aeschylus produced 
the Oresteia.
42. See Kaufmann’s fn. 2 in BT on the inaccuracy of Nietzsche’s claim that Euripides is the 
most optimistic and antitragic of the tragedians (discussed in BT 12– 14). See also Nussbaum, 
introduction to The Bacchae of Euripides. It is plausible that Nietzsche’s concern with historical 
accuracy is subordinated to the aim of reinvigorating our culture via myth. On the rhetorical 
function of Nietzsche’s historical distortion, see Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, 30– 31. 
Support for this general idea comes from the fact that, in other texts, Nietzsche’s relation-
ship to Socrates is far from wholly negative. In a text written a year after the publication of 
Birth, Nietzsche classes Socrates among his favorite pre- Socratic philosophers. See Nietzsche, 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 31. On the symbolic function of Socrates in Nietzsche’s 
narrative of tragedy, see  chapters 6 and 7 of Silk and Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy.
43. Later in the passage Nietzsche claims that this conceptual connection between suffering 
and guilt in the Christian moral framework precludes modern Europeans from having a name 
for what the Greeks called “pity.”
44. More fully: “Everything there is, or was, of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, or mas-
terly assurance on earth, whether in thinking itself, or in ruling, or in speaking and persuad-
ing, in artists just as in ethical practices, has only developed by virtue of the ‘tyranny of such 
arbitrary laws.’ … I will say it again: what seems to be essential ‘in heaven and on earth’ is 
that there be obedience in one direction for a long time… . This always brings and has brought 
about something that makes life on earth worth living— for instance: virtue, art, music, dance, 
reason, intellect— something that transfigures, something refined, fantastic and divine” 
(BGE 188).
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45. To be fair, Nietzsche’s would be a psychological thesis and so neither known a priori nor 
a necessary truth.
46. I have in mind social psychological work suggesting that “people who are able to construct 
a good narrative, particularly one that connects early setbacks and suffering to later triumph, 
are happier and more productive than those who lack such a ‘redemption narrative.’ ”  Haidt, 
The Righteous Mind, 443n24. This point is extracted from McAdams, The Redemptive Self, and 
McAdams and Pals, “A New Big Five.”
47. Dodds, “Morals and Politics in the Oresteia,” 263.
48. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 36.
49. Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 172.
50. We should not give Orestes too much credit, however. Although he expresses remorse 
over killing his mother, once cleansed by Apollo he silently joins the latter in denying that 
Clytemnestra was in fact a blood relative.
51. Williams, “The Women of Trachis,” 58, 59.
52. For an illuminating discussion of Nietzsche’s nonstandard use of “aesthetic justification,” 
see Leiter, “The Truth Is Terrible.”
53. Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, 69.
54. I owe this thought to Joshua Fox, who also brings to my attention Schopenhauer’s claim 
that humankind “is not exactly imperfection, as has often been said, but rather distortion, in 
everything” (Parerga and Paralipomena, 304).
55. There is a risk of making a straw man of Williams here. Williams’s students sometimes 
mean something weaker by pessimism:  just that one’s well- being is subject to many factors 
beyond one’s control. See, for example, Russell, “Free Will Pessimism.” Our abilities and actions 
are subject to conditions of luck; this observation cannot be denied. But if the belief that I lack 
full control over my well- being is sufficient for pessimism, the debate over pessimism becomes 
stale: everyone who acknowledges her lack of self- sufficiency or vulnerability on external goods 
will be a pessimist. Presumably, and in order to avoid the near triviality of being a pessimist, 
it should be necessary for commitment to pessimism that one at least have a certain affective 
and behavioral orientation toward the world, say, one of “dismay”? Nietzsche appears to think 
about pessimism. He claims, for instance, that Schopenhauer’s entitlement to being a pessimist 
is undermined by his regular flute playing (BGE 186)! Given that Nietzsche opposes pessimism 
on the grounds that we ought to “rejoice” in the face of the suffering found in life (TI VIII: 5), 
we can be confident that he does not endorse an orientation of dismay. Furthermore, given that 
Williams takes the “morality system” to be a contingent historical product, it appears that dis-
may would be appropriate only relative to unreasonable expectations about what agency consists 
in. In this case, if dismay (and so pessimism) is ever appropriate, it will be so only in transition 
away from the deep- rooted belief in the morality system. I borrow the picture of “dismay” as 
transitional to the appropriate attitude of “affirmation” from Ted Honderich, whose view is 
aptly, I  think, put forward in a Nietzschean spirit; see his The Consequences of Determinism, 
esp. 146.
56. For an elaborate exposition of normative hope, see Martin, How We Hope, esp. 118– 40.
57. Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy,” 113.
58. Robinson, “Mercy, Crime Control, and Moral Credibility.”
59. These figures are from the Bard Prison Initiative website, http:// bpi.bard.edu/ faqs/ .
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